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1. Introduction 
 
Globalisation, or increasing international economic integration, is arguably one of the main 
forces that have shaped the world since the second half of the 20th century. The increasing 
ubiquity of the many symptoms of globalisation, in particular the large trade, investment and 
worker flows, has therefore led to substantial interest in the economic impacts of these changes. 
As the economic domain that plays the greater direct role in the determination of people’s 
welfare, the labour market has received considerable attention by economists interested in 
evaluating the consequences of globalisation.  
 
One specific aspect of this topic that has sparked considerable controversy is the impact of 
foreign firms on wages. On the one hand, many individuals and organisations, mostly outside 
academia, claim that multinational firms pay lower wages, especially in developing countries, 
and present that perception as a key motivation for their opposition to globalisation. However, 
on the other hand, this topic boasts a clear stylised fact within academic circles, which argue 
precisely the opposite of what is asserted by the opponents to globalisation: as discussed below, 
an overwhelming majority of studies finds that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages, to 
equivalent workers, than their domestic-owned counterparts. 
 
This is a debate of great importance also for policy-makers across the world, who have in many 
cases invested large amounts of public funds in order to attract foreign multinationals to their 
economies, possibly believing that the presence of these firms could be an important source of 
increased prosperity. One channel of such presumed impacts includes the employment created 
by such foreign-owned firms and the higher wages they are perceived to pay, at least when one 
takes into account most of the available academic research.1 In this context, it is also important 
to make sure that foreign direct investment does indeed lead to the creation of high-wage firms. 
 
A final motivation point concerns the debate about the relative importance of international trade 
and technology in explaining the increasing wage inequality observed in some countries, in 
particular the U.S. and the U.K., since the 1980’s (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). Regardless of 
whether one considers FDI by itself or as component of trade, it is also of interest from the point 
                                                 
1 Another channel concerns the possible (productivity) spillovers to domestic firms. In this case, recent literature 
surveys (see Görg and Greenaway, 2004) find, at best, mixed effects.  
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of view of this literature to assess whether increasing FDI flows can explain higher wage 
inequality in host countries. Of course, this will be the case if similar workers are paid different 
wage rates depending on the nationality of their firms, which is consistent with the observed 
increase of within or residual inequality. 
 
In this context, this paper aims at examining the robustness of the wage premium attributed to 
foreign firms. In particular, we try to assess whether that premium can be understood in terms of 
a causal impact of the firms’ ownership type (domestic or foreign) on wages. This causal impact 
is, in our view, the parameter of interest should one want to understand the consequences of this 
aspect of globalisation (its link with wages), rather than simply to describe a statistical result. 
 
Our methodology involves studying differences in pay between workers in foreign and domestic 
firms using different econometric methods, each of them drawing on different assumptions and 
focusing on different aspects of the wage determination process. Such variety of methods is 
facilitated by our use of a large matched employer-employee panel data set, covering more than 
five million workers-year in the Portuguese labour market over the 1991-99 period. Portugal is 
also an interesting case study, as it has received large inflows of Foreign Direct Investment since 
European Union membership in 1986. Moreover, wages in Portugal have been the lowest in the 
European Union up to the 2004 enlargement: this may possibly make it easier to observe higher 
wages in foreign firms. 
 
As to our results, when using standard (OLS) methods we find that foreign firms (defined in 
different ways) pay higher wages. However, this result does not hold with different econometric 
methods. For instance, we do not observe a higher wage premium for firms that exhibit a 
stronger degree of control by foreign parties. More importantly, the result of a significantly 
positive wage premium is not obtained when workers in domestic and foreign firms are matched 
by their propensity scores. The same occurs when we look at the same set of workers before and 
after their initially-domestic-owned firms are acquired by foreign investors and compare that 
with workers whose firms remain domestically owned. Overall, we conclude that our results 
indicate that there is not a causal effect of foreign ownership on wages. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys some of the key contributions 
in the literature on the foreign-firm wage premium and critically evaluates their possible 
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theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 presents the data set used and some descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 presents the results, obtained under different estimators. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Literature and Theory  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the empirical literature that examines the impact of foreign 
firms on host-country labour markets typically finds that such firms pay higher wages. Below 
we briefly summarise some of the main contributions. 
 
In an important study, Aitken et al. (1996) use establishment level cross-sections for Mexico, the 
USA and Venezuela and find evidence of higher wages in foreign firms in the three countries 
covered. Using OLS, the premium ranges between 38% in Mexico and 12% in the US, across 
different specifications. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) focus on the US case using industry-state-
ownership cells and again find evidence of a positive wage differential, but which however 
disappears (for the manufacturing sector only) when controls for firm characteristics are added. 
Griffith and Simpson (2003) present estimates for the UK, finding in all specifications positive 
premia for foreign firms. 
 
In research that focuses only on developing countries, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2001) study the 
Indonesian case and find a premium of 12% for blue-collar workers and 22% for white-collar 
workers. The results are obtained by drawing on a 1996 cross-section of plants and regressing 
average wages on plant characteristics, including their domestic or foreign ownership type. 
Velde and Morrissey (2003) examine the cases of five African countries (Cameroon, Ghana, 
Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and again find that foreign firms pay higher wages (the premia 
range between 8% and 23% across the counries). Similar results are documented for Ghana by 
Görg et al. (2002).2 
 
From this brief literature survey, one concludes that there is a great degree of agreement in the 
empirical research about the wage practices of foreign firms in host labour markets: foreign 
                                                 
2 Another strand in this literature adopts a difference-in-differences approach at the wage differences following the 
acquisition of domestic firms by foreign investors. These studies, which also generally conclude that wages increase 
in firms that undergo acquisition, are examined in Section 4.5. A different strand, not directly related to our topic in 
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firms pay higher wages to equivalent workers. One also notices that most papers draw on similar 
research methodologies, namely by applying OLS to firm-level data. However, it is well known 
that a causal interpretation of these findings under OLS requires the (strong) assumption of 
orthogonality of firm ownership with respect to the error term. Moreover, domestic and foreign 
firms typically display very different (observable) characteristics. For instance, it is not 
uncommon that the average size (number of workers) of foreign firms is at least five times that 
of the size of domestic firms. To this extent, given the different supports for each type of firms, 
the quality of like-for-like comparisons produced by OLS may be poor, leading to biased results. 
These hypotheses (about orthogonality and the quality of comparisons) are explored in greater 
detail in Section 4. 
 
Before that, we present and critically evaluate some theoretical views that have been put forward 
to explain the stylised fact that foreign firms pay higher wages. From our reading of the 
literature, we consider the following four possible views: increased labour demand, rent sharing, 
compensating differentials, and unobservable heterogeneity.  
 
The first explanation is that foreign firms, as they enter the domestic country, may increase 
labour demand. This will necessarily occur in the case of greenfield investments. It may also 
possibly occur in the case of acquisitions – the most predominant method of entry for foreign 
firms in developed countries – if, for instance, (foreign) multinationals3 decide to expand 
production in the host country beyond the previous output level of the acquired firm and that 
implies hiring additional workers. Moreover, should the labour supply curve be positively 
sloped, then wages for the marginal workers hired by multinationals will be higher than those of 
infra-marginal workers.  
 
One concern with this and other similar views is that the nationality of the firm per se would not 
be expected to matter, in the sense of being a key determinant in the increase of labour demand: 
the same increase would also apply to domestic firms that entered the market or increased their 
workforce. Moreover, it is important to stress that the higher wages paid by foreign firms would 
critically depend on the labour market not being sufficiently competitive. Otherwise, the wage 
                                                                                                                                                            
this paper, looks at wage spillovers from foreign to domestic firms: see Aitken et al (1996) and Feenstra and 
Hanson (1997). 
3 Throughout the text we use “foreign firms” and “multinationals” interchangeably: Portuguese firms with 
subsidiaries abroad are considered as domestic firms for the purposes of this paper. 
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differentials would not be sustained for long as the rents of workers in (new and/or expanding) 
foreign firms would be competed away via worker mobility from domestic firms. If, on the other 
hand, labour markets are competitive, such wage differentials would probably not even arise in 
the first instance, as labour supply curves under competitive markets would be essentially 
horizontal: this is precisely the standard view in neoclassical trade theory. 
 
At this stage, we should underline that a competitive labour market model is unlikely to apply in 
the case of many countries. This is particularly true for Portugal, the country studied in this 
paper, given the rigidities brought by institutions (namely labour law) and other non-competitive 
forces.4 In this context, our choice of Portugal as the country under study biases our analysis 
against the rejection of the hypothesis of a foreign-firm premium, at least under the labour 
demand explanation. In other words, since the labour market presents many non-competitive 
features, it is more likely that higher wages in foreign firms will not be competed away by 
workers in domestic firms and that new or expanding firms will face a positively sloped labour 
supply curve. 
 
A second explanation is that multinationals may pay a wage premium to dissuade workers from 
moving to other firms or disrupting activity. This is consistent with the Ownership-Location-
Internalisation model of Dunning (1977), in particular with the internalisation motive.5 Under 
this model, foreign firms own special assets (e.g. new products or technologies) that are more 
profitably exploited abroad via FDI than via exporting (or franchising schemes). Foreign firms 
would then pay higher wages in order to prevent the costly turnover which would occur once 
quitters provided insights about the multinationals’ specific assets to competing firms (see 
Fosfuri et al., 2001). Alternatively, or complementarily, foreign firms may share with workers 
some of the rents produced by those assets, driving their wages above those of comparable 
individuals working in firms that do not generate such rents. 
 
                                                 
4 For instance, Blanchard and Portugal (2001) highlight the large burden to economic efficiency brought by 
restrictive firing regulations. Portugal and Cardoso (2003) also do not find any employment effects of minimum 
wage laws, unlike what one expects in a competitive market. Additionally, Martins (2004c) presents evidence of 
substantial levels of rent sharing. 
5 Other prominent models of FDI, such as the vertical, horizontal and capital-knowledge models, are more difficult 
to be applied in the context of pay determination. But see Markusen and Venables (1997) for a study of the role of 
multinationals in explaining wage inequality (between skilled and unskilled workers) and Martins (2004b) for an 
examination of different FDI models using US domestic and multinational data. 
 7
Although this type of explanation is appealing, it again raises some concerns. One issue is that, 
while foreign firms may indeed generate rents, such firms are also likely to have stronger 
bargaining power than domestic firms, since they may easily shift production (and thus 
employment) across countries (see Caves, 1996, pp. 123-131). Consistent results are obtained in 
Martins (2003b), which compares the extent of rent sharing in large, export-oriented domestic- 
and foreign-owned firms in Portugal and rejects the hypothesis that workers in foreign firms 
benefit more from rent sharing than similar workers in domestic firms. 
 
Another concern is that this rent-sharing view assumes that foreign firms are more likely to draw 
on special assets than a representative domestic firm. In other words, it may not be 
“foreignness” itself that drives the pay gap, but rather the differences in the average 
characteristics of domestic and foreign firms. In this case, one again cannot interpret the pay 
differences between the two types of firms in a causal way.  
 
A third explanation for the stylised fact that foreign firms pay higher wages is about 
compensating differentials. For instance, multinationals may provide less interesting job 
amenities than domestic firms. Workers would thus have to be compensated in the form of 
higher wages in order to take jobs in foreign-owned firms. Although this view is theoretically 
reasonable, it would mean that workers are not better-off in foreign-owned firms. Moreover, the 
little evidence available, including Sutherland (2002) and Brown et al (2003) for developed and 
developing countries, respectively, suggests that working conditions are better in foreign firms. 
The first paper finds that workers exhibit higher levels of job satisfaction in foreign-owned firms 
while the second suggests that working conditions are more enjoyable in foreign firms. In their 
study of Portugal, Mata and Portugal (2002) also find no differences in exit probabilities 
between domestic and foreign firms: workers would therefore be expected not to demand a pay 
premium to compensate them for a higher probability of displacement when employed by a 
foreign firm.6 
 
Finally, foreign firms may select workers that are more skilled in dimensions unobservable to 
the researcher. For instance, given the larger size of multinationals, both when taken 
individually in each host country and particularly when taken jointly in all countries in which 
                                                 
6 Görg and Strobl (2003) find mixed results for the case of Ireland: foreign firms are more likely to exit but the jobs 
they create are more persistent. 
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they operate, these firms may benefit from scale economies in setting up sophisticated human 
resource departments. This would allow these firms to screen and hire the best applicants for 
their vacancies, possibly also along dimensions of skill not observable by the researcher. Under 
this case, the wage differential attributed to multinationals would be spurious and no causal 
impact of foreign ownership upon wages could be inferred. This also means that evidence of 
wage differentials should not necessarily support the case for government intervention, to the 
extent that foreign firms are not effectively paying higher wages to comparable workers. 
 
Overall, we conclude in this section that there are few, if any, theoretical reasons to reconcile the 
empirical stylised fact of a foreign-firm wage premium with a causal relationship between 
foreign ownership and pay. Moreover, the little empirical evidence available does not support 
such theoretical explanations. The strongest account is probably that labour markets may not be 
sufficiently competitive, but even this view does not highlight any reasons why foreign firms 
would be different from similar domestic firms. This conclusion further motivates the empirical 
work carried out in this paper, in which we empirically examine the robustness of the stylised 
fact about pay differences between foreign and domestic firms. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
Our analysis draws on a large matched employer-employee data set, “Quadros de Pessoal” 
(Personnel Records). This is a compulsory survey run by the Ministry of Employment and which 
covers all firms located in Portugal with at least one employee. Those firms are required to 
provide information on an annual basis about their characteristics and those of their workforce. 
The former variables include geographical location, industry, sales and the share of the firm’s 
equity owned by foreign parties. The set of worker characteristics includes gender, highest 
qualification, tenure, wages and hours worked.  
 
There are also unique (time-invariant) identifiers for each firm and each worker that allow each 
one of them to be followed over time. Information for each worker-year also includes his/her 
employer’s identifier, allowing for the matching of the two sides of the labour market. It should 
also be mentioned that particular care is placed on the reliability of the information, as that is 
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used by the Ministry of Employment for the purpose of checking the employer’s compliance 
with labour law. 
 
The data set considered here is an 80% representative sample of all manufacturing sector firms. 
The information refers to each year in the period 1991-99 and to a specific month of each year 
(March up to 1993 and October from 1994 onwards). There is also information on all workers of 
each firm sampled in each year.7 This amounts to an annual average of about 678,000 workers 
per year and 29,481 firms (and a total of 71,240 different firms). After dropping observations 
with missing or inconsistent information in key variables and firms based outside continental 
Portugal we obtain a data set with an annual average of 601,000 workers and 16,935 firms (and 
a total of 39,783 different firms).  
 
The foreign/domestic firm ownership type is derived from the share of equity held by foreign 
nationals. We define as foreign firms those for which at least 50% of equity is owned by foreign 
parties,8 and we obtain an annual average of 16,557 domestic and 378 foreign firms. These firms 
correspond to 434,000 workers in domestic firms and 62,600 workers in foreign firms – the 
yearly data are available on Tables 1 (workers) and 2 (firms). This sizeable share of workers in 
foreign firms is also in line with the large flows of inward FDI in Portugal, especially since 
European Union membership in 1986 – over the 1990’s, such flows averaged about 7% of GDP 
per year. 
 
The descriptive statistics reveal some important differences between foreign and domestic firms. 
For instance, in all measures of earnings (monthly or hourly), workers in foreign firms earn 
more than their counterparts in domestic firms. In 1991, for example, the average worker in a 
foreign firm earned €691 per month (2000 prices), whilst the average worker in a domestic firm 
                                                 
7 This means there is attrition in the panel at the firm level but not at the worker level: only the workers of the firms 
that are not sampled in a given year will not be present in the data. 
8 Some authors use a 10% threshold, in line with the International Monetary Fund criterion that distinguishes 
between portfolio and direct foreign investment flows. We have opted for the 50% level instead because we want to 
focus on the impacts of foreign firm ownership (and not of firms with some positive level of foreign participation). 
However, we acknowledge that a 50% foreign-ownership share is not either a necessary or a sufficient condition for 
foreign control, since there may be more than one foreign or domestic investor per firm. For the benefit of 
robustness, we present in the Appendix an analysis of our data using the 10% threshold – see Tables A1a and A1b. 
We find little differences from the results documented in the main text. There is only a small increase in the 
percentage of workers in foreign firms (from 13% to 16%), suggesting that most firms with a positive level of 
foreign ownership are above the 50% threshold. These results are also consistent with those of Barbosa and Louri 
(2002). 
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earned only €528, implying a pay premium of 30.9%. In the end of the decade, the 
corresponding values were €863 and €628 (and a pay premium of 37.4%). 
 
These differences in earnings can be partly explained by differences in schooling attainment: 
workers in foreign firms are found to have an (unweighted) average of 6.9 years of schooling 
across the nine years covered, whereas the same figure for workers in domestic firms is only 5.8. 
On the other hand, workers in domestic firms are found to be more experienced. This is partly 
due to their lower schooling, as we are measuring Mincer experience (age-experience-6).  
 
As to the distribution of workers by industries, again there are clear differences between 
domestic and foreign firms. A particularly striking contrast is the over-representation of foreign 
firms in the Metallic and Transport industry (43% against 19% of workers). In an opposite 
direction stands the Textiles, Clothing and Leather industry (29% of foreign workers against 
38% of domestic workers) and the Wood and Cork industry (1% against 8%). These differences 
have also a geographical dimension, as workers of foreign firm are relatively more prevalent in 
the Lisbon region (40% versus 23%) and less prevalent in the North region (40% versus 52%).9  
 
A complementary way to establish the contrast between domestic and foreign ownership can be 
pursued by looking at firm (rather than worker) unweighted averages, i.e. without weighting 
firm characteristics by their firm size. This exercise – see Table 2 – reveals even stronger pay 
differences between foreign and domestic firms. For instance, in 1999, the average multinational 
paid €889 to an average worker (€502 for the average domestic firm), which amounts to a pay 
premium of 77.1%, more than twice the premium documented for same year in Table 1.10 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 OLS estimator 
 
                                                 
9 See Guimarães et al. (2000) for a study of FDI agglomeration in Portugal. 
10 An important explanation for this difference between the worker and firm data lies on the fact that foreign firms 
are, on average, much bigger, at least in terms of the number of workers. Foreign firms have an average of 190 
workers whereas domestic firms have an average of only 32 workers. This helps in understanding the very large pay 
difference as it is well known that smaller firms pay lower wages (Brown and Medoff, 1989, and Oy and Idson, 
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In this section, different versions of the following wage equation are considered: 
 
 yi = Xi’β1 + Fj(i)’β2 + β3Foreignj(i) + εi      (1) 
 
yi denotes the logarithm of real hourly wages. Xi denotes a set of human capital characteristics 
(six dummies for educational attainment, a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure – 
measured in months, and a female dummy). Fj(i) denotes a set of characteristics of the firm j of 
worker i (four regional dummies, log number of workers, a dummy for public firms and eight 
industry dummies11). Foreignj(i) is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm of worker i is a 
multinational and 0 otherwise. Our attention is focused on the β3 coefficient.12 εi is the error 
term.  
 
The first version of equation (1) includes only the foreign dummy. In this case, the wage 
premium for workers in foreign firms is found to average 32%, ranging between 27% and 37% 
across the different years – see the first row of Table 3. However, as suggested before, these 
wage differences may be attributed to different levels of human capital. Indeed, it is found that, 
when one controls for these variables, the (unweighted) average premium falls to 27% (ranging 
between 23% and 32%). Finally, when firm characteristics are also considered, the premium 
falls further and more substantially than when human capital variables were added. The average 
premium is now only 11%, ranging between 8% and 13%.13 
 
Overall, these results, which are in line with those of studies for other countries, suggest that 
about two thirds of the average difference in pay between domestic and foreign firms are 
determined by the different human capital of their workers and, more importantly, by the 
different characteristics of foreign and domestic firms. However, at 11%, the pay gap between 
domestic and foreign firms is still economically significant and may suggest an important effect 
of multinationals on wages.  
                                                                                                                                                            
1999), although it is less well known why this is so. No other major differences are found in terms of the industry or 
geographical distributions of domestic and foreign firms in the worker statistics table.  
11 A new industry code was adopted in 1995. We use the old, more-aggregated version (“CAE-Rev.1”). Given that 
some firms are not available in our sample in the period 1991-1994, their industry code was obtained from 
extrapolating from the changes observed in such codes for firms present in both periods (1991-94 and 1995-99). 
12 This coefficient is discussed in terms of percentage differences in wages, after taking into account the logarithmic 
transformation of wages. 
13 As to time trends, there is some evidence, in the first and second specifications, of increasing foreign 
multinational wage premia between 1991 and 1995, when they peak, and declining premia from then until 1999. 
This pattern is however not present in the specification that includes both human capital and firm controls. 
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These results assume a constant pay premium for different industries. But there are many 
reasons for one to expect that foreign wage differentials to depend on the industry examined. For 
instance, and following the theoretical discussion in Section 2, multinationals in technology-
intensive industries may have to pay larger premia so to prevent the dissemination of their new 
methods to competitors via workers’ mobility. However, in other industries, multinationals may 
see no need to pay above market wages. Indeed, under the case of vertical FDI (which is the 
case that best fits Portugal, given its relatively small domestic market), multinationals may 
choose a given host country precisely in order to pay lower wages. 
 
We look at this possibility, by allowing the multinational premium to depend on the industry. 
Table 4 presents the results: the first eight main rows denote the average industry premia, the 
following row refers to the average foreign firm premium and the last eight rows present the 
industry-specific premium. The comparison group (dropped dummy) is the Clothing, Textiles 
and Leather industry, the biggest one in our data and also one of the industries that pays the 
lowest premia.14 In contrast, the four industries that exhibit higher average premia are Wood, 
Paper, Chemicals, Non-Metallic Minerals and Metallurgic sectors.  
 
As to the differences in the multinational premium, the industries in which the premium is larger 
are Food, Wood, Paper and Chemicals, where the average additional premia range between 26% 
(Food) and 17% (Chemicals). In the remaining industries, Clothing, Non-Metallic Minerals, 
Metallurgic, Metallic and Others, the average additional premia range between 8% (Non-
Metallic Minerals) and 0% (the dropped industry, Clothing).  
 
These findings may represent some mild support for the hypothesis described above about 
different incentives across different industries to pay above-market wage rates. For instance, 
Chemicals pay higher foreign premia and are probably a good example of an industry where 
patents and other inputs that generate rents are prevalent. On the other hand, Clothing, which 
pays the lowest wages and the lowest foreign premium, may be a good example of an industry 
that draws on standard technical processes. 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Martins (2003a) for a study of wage determination in this industry. 
 13
4.2 Different levels of control 
 
In this section, we test the hypothesis that a greater share of foreign ownership leads to a greater 
foreign premium. This would occur under the case of a causal impact of foreign ownership upon 
wages. We test this by allowing the wage impact of foreign firms to differ depending on the 
degree of control of the firm by the multinational, as implicit in the share of the firm’s equity 
held by foreign parties.  
 
In particular, we create different dummy variables for firms with different share of foreign 
control: 1%-9%, 10-19%, …, 90%-99% and 100%. Within the group of firms which are 
considered as foreign-owned, the most prevalent category is that of full foreign control (which 
accounts for 60% of workers in foreign firms) and then that of 90%-99% (20% of workers). 
Within the group of firms that have less than 50% foreign shares, they correspond to between 
.5% and 2% of the workers in domestic firms.  
 
We find – see Table 5a – positive premia for all workers whose firms have some positive share 
of equity held by foreign parties, regardless of the size of that share. For instance, firms with a 
share of equity of between 1% and 9% pay their workers, on average across the decade, 12% 
more than similar workers in firms without any share of equity held by foreigners.  
 
Although average premia are higher in the 50%-100% range than in the 1%-49% range, there is 
no clear evidence of a monotonic relationship between premia and the share of foreign 
ownership. This result weakens the case for a strong causal relationship between the degree of 
control and the wage differential. However, one must bear in mind the relatively low number of 
workers in firms that exhibit low but positive levels of foreign ownership. This may explain the 
considerable volatility in the estimates for lower levels of foreign ownership at different years. 
 
As a further check on this link between the degree of foreign control and the wage premium, we 
also investigated the wage difference between domestic and foreign firms when the latter are 
defined at different thresholds. Here we consider ownership starting alternatively at the 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40% and 50% levels and compute the premium accordingly. Taking into account the 
hypothesis described above that greater control translates into a higher premium, we expect that 
the greater the ownership threshold, the higher the premium.  
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Consistently with the previous findings, the results – see Table 5b – indicate that there is no 
monotonically positive relationship between the premium and the level of control. Moreover, in 
most years the premium is found to fall at higher levels of control. Overall, the results presented 
in this sub-section are evidence against a causal link between foreign ownership and wages. 
 
 
4.3 Quantile Regression 
 
As suggested in Section 2, the commonly documented wage premium of foreign firms may be 
explained by unobservable differences between their workers and those of domestic firms. 
Under this view, the average wage in foreign firms could be pushed upwards by a longer right 
tail of the conditional wage distributions for workers in those firms. Such longer tail would 
represent the higher ability (and wages) of the more skilled workers hired by foreign firms. 
 
This difference between the wage distributions of domestic and foreign firms would however 
not be uncovered by OLS. This method examines only the impact of regressors on the mean of 
the dependent variable. In this case, quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) can be used 
instead, as it examines the possibility that the impact of a regressor (the foreign-firm dummy) 
varies along the distribution of the dependent variable (wages).15  
 
We test this hypothesis drawing on the wage specification of equation 1, considering the wider 
set of controls for firm and worker characteristics. Using quantile regression, we look at returns 
at the 75th and 25th percentiles, which proxy the top and bottom of the wage distribution, 
respectively. We find that the foreign-firm wage premium is generally larger at the top than at 
the bottom of the distribution – see Table 6. Except for 1991 and 1992, the foreign-firm 
premium is always statistically larger at the top of the distribution at the 1% level (using 
simultaneous estimation of both quantiles) and the difference is between about 2 and 3 
percentage points.  
 
                                                 
15 In the context of inter-industry wage differentials, Martins (2004a) suggests that, if such differentials are 
explainable by workers unobserved heterogeneity, then such wage dispersion is likely to be higher at the top than at 
the bottom of the wage distribution. Quantile regression would then capture the over-representation of high-ability 
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Following the theoretical discussion in Section 2, these findings are consistent with the case of 
unobserved worker differences driving the foreign-firm premium. Should all workers in foreign 
firms be of a similar unobserved quality to their counterparts in domestic firms, one would 
expect the wage premium to be the same along the wage distribution. However, we show here 
that, although the premium is positive at the bottom of the distribution, it is even higher at the 
top. Therefore those workers in foreign firms whose skills place them at the top of their 
conditional wage distributions benefit from a stronger premium with respect to their 
counterparts at the bottom of the distribution. This is consistent with the view that workers in 
foreign firms are more skilled along unobserved dimensions. However, an alternative 
explanation is that foreign firms reward unobserved skills more generously. 
 
 
4.4 Propensity Score Matching 
 
One concern with OLS estimators is that their “like-for-like” comparisons disregard the 
possibility of a different support (i.e. range of values of the regressors) between observations 
with and without some characteristic whose impact is of interest. Moreover, the distribution of 
characteristics over that region of common support may also be very different between the two 
groups, further biasing OLS results. Heckman et al (1997) suggests that these two biases (non-
overlapping support and different distributions of covariates) are more important than the bias 
related to selection on unobservables. The latter bias has however received much more attention, 
at least in the literature on programme evaluation (e.g., job training). In their words, “the simple 
balancing of observables goes a long way towards effective evaluation” (p. 607). 
 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a non-parametric method that tackles these issues directly 
by restricting the analysis over the region of common support (i.e. by only comparing 
observations that are effectively comparable) and by taking into account the distribution of the 
regressors across each group under study. The relevance of this method for the analysis 
conducted in this paper stems from the large differences documented in terms of the observable 
characteristics of the two types of workers. As discussed before, these differences are 
particularly pronounced along the educational attainment of workers, and their firm size and 
                                                                                                                                                            
workers in high-wage industries. Unlike in the present paper, no differences in premia along the distribution are 
found. 
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industry distribution. Failure to take this into account may thus have seriously biased our 
previous results.  
 
In this sub-section, we implement PSM, using the same annual data sets described before. The 
variables considered for the estimation of the propensity score are: six education dummies, 
experience, tenure, gender, log firm size, three region dummies (north, centre and Lisbon) and 
four industry dummies (textiles, wood, chemicals and metallic). It is this propensity score, 
obtained via a logit estimation, that will be used to match workers in foreign firms to those in 
domestic firms, in this case via the one-to-one matching procedure.16 
 
The first nine rows of Table 7 present the results. The estimates of the foreign firm premium 
range between –8.9% (1994) and 1.1% (1998), averaging -1.22% over the nine years studied. 
Most coefficients are not significant. Therefore, the average premium (and, to a lesser extent, its 
variability across years) stand in clear contrast with the findings in sub-section 4.1 and in the 
literature of a positive and “large” impact of foreign ownership on wages. However, this is not at 
odds with the finding in section 4.1 that a more detailed comparison of workers in domestic and 
foreign firms leads to substantially lower estimates of the foreign-firm wage premium and the 
finding in sub-section 4.2 of no monotonic relationship between foreign control and the wage 
differential. 
 
 
4.5 Acquisitions – difference-in-differences 
 
The difference-in-differences method involves contrasting the change in a variable of interest in 
a group of observations that have undergone some treatment with the change in the same 
variable in a similar group of observations but which have not undergone such treatment. The 
advantage of this approach is that one is able to control indirectly for variables that may 
influence the parameter of interest but which may not be available, provided that such variables 
are time-invariant and the assignment to treatment is random. Here, we apply this method for the 
case of domestic firms that are acquired by multinationals: such acquisition is the treatment 
                                                 
16 Since the estimation proved very time consuming, in particular because the standard errors are obtained via 
bootstrapping (50 repetitions) and the data set is very large, we use a subset of the original data set in this sub-
section. For each year, this subset was made of a random sample of 20% of the observations for workers in 
domestic firms added to the full sample of workers in foreign firms.  
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whose impacts are studied vis-à-vis the control group of domestic firms that are not acquired 
over the period considered.  
 
A similar approach is used in Conyon et al (2002) and in Almeida (2003).17 The first paper uses 
UK firm level panel data and focuses on the productivity and wage impacts of acquisitions, 
contrasting the case of acquisitions originated by foreign multinationals and other domestic 
firms. The authors find evidence of higher wage growth when domestic firms are acquired by 
multinationals than when domestic firms are not acquired by any firm. However, those domestic 
firms that are acquired already exhibit higher levels of wage growth before acquisition than 
those firms that are not acquired, suggesting some role for “cherry picking”. Another interesting 
result is that, after controlling for productivity, the wage differential is eliminated.18 However, it 
is not obvious that one should control for productivity differences. If such productivity 
differences are due to, say, different management practices brought by the new owners, any 
wage differences that arise should be interpreted as a causal impact of ownership change. 
 
Almeida (2003) also studies the wage impacts of foreign acquisition using the “Quadros de 
Pessoal” data set. However, some important differences in relation to what is done in this 
subsection are that Almeida considers both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector, 
although using data aggregated at the firm level. Moreover, foreign ownership (or acquisition) is 
defined at the 10% equity threshold. Focusing on the case of manufacturing firms, Almeida’s 
estimates of the foreign firm wage premium are found to fall from 0.16 in the OLS cross-section 
estimator (a similar value to the 11% premium we estimate using worker-levels regressions) to 
an insignificant coefficient of 0.02 in the difference-in-differences results. As with Conyon et al 
(2002), important observational differences between acquired and always-domestic firms are 
also documented, even before acquisition. 
 
Our contribution to this literature is twofold. Firstly, we take the analysis to worker-level data, in 
order to minimise the aggregation bias implicit in firm-level information. Secondly, we focus on 
the same workers before and after acquisition (stayers). This should substantially decrease the 
                                                 
17 Other recent papers include Girma and Görg (2003) for the UK and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2003) for Indonesia, 
both drawing on firm-level data. Both papers document higher wage growth for acquired firms, although the first 
finds that this result applies only to some industries and when the acquirers are of specific nationalities.  
18 Similar results are obtained when the acquisition dummy is instrumented. However, it is not clear whether the 
instruments used in the paper pass the validity tests, i.e. whether they can be excluded from the main equation and 
whether they contribute to the explanatory power of the auxiliary regression. 
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scope of unobserved heterogeneity to bias our estimates of the foreign ownership effect. 
Moreover, this approach also means that we do not suffer from the biases that may occur when, 
upon acquisition, firms adjust their workforces, particularly when such changes occur along 
unobserved dimensions. For instance, the wage increase documented in Conyon et al (2002) 
could arise if the foreign owners replace some incumbents prior to acquisition with more skilled 
individuals.  
 
We construct the data set used in this subsection as follows. The control group includes all firms 
which are never foreign owned over the up to nine years in which such firms are available in our 
sample. Only two specific years are considered for the wage analysis: the “before” year is 
randomly selected in the 1991-1998 range, while the “after” year is the subsequent year 
available in the sample for that firm. (This is not necessarily the “before” year plus one as the 
panel is unbalanced.) A total of 23,991 firms (and about 250,000 workers) were found with this 
method.  
 
The treatment group (domestic firms acquired by foreign parties) was defined as the set of firms 
whose ownership is initially domestic (i.e. share of equity owned by foreign parties below 50%) 
and which in some subsequent year become foreign-owned. Firms following this criterion but in 
which the foreign acquisition process is reversed at a later stage were dropped. A total of 231 
firms (and about 18,000 workers) were found.  
 
These two groups of firms and workers were found to be very different, as far as their 
observable characteristics are concerned – see Table 8. The treatment workers are more 
educated than their control group counterparts. The former are also over-represented in bigger 
firms and in the metallic industry while they are under-represented in the clothing industry, for 
instance. The distribution of acquisitions per year, in terms of workers, is also less balanced as in 
the control group, particularly in 1992 (25% vs 12%) and in 1995 (6% vs 13%). Importantly, 
there is also a substantial difference in wage growth for each group of workers: the treatment 
group has an average wage growth of 0.6% whereas for the control group that figure is 5.1%. 
 
These differences in wage growth may however be due to the different characteristics of each 
type of workers, not to the acquisition effect. The impact of the treatment was therefore obtained 
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from running a regression in which the dependent variable is wage growth between the “before” 
and “after” period, i.e. differences of the log hourly wage, as in the equation below: 
 
 ∆yit,t-1 = Xit-1’β1 + Fj(i),t-1’β2 + β3Foreignj(i),t + β4∆tit + εit  ,   (2) 
 
The regressors are the characteristics of the workers and their firms in the “before” period (t-1) 
and on a dummy variable (Foreign) taking value one for workers in firms that become foreign-
owned and value zero for workers in firms that are still domestically-owned in the second 
period. A control for the difference in years between the two periods (∆tit) is also included. 
 
Consistently with the descriptive statistics, the regression results indicate that, after controlling 
for the differences in worker characteristics, the impact of foreign acquisition on wages is 
significantly negative, at –3.1 p.p..19 This negative result is apparently due to the fact that the 
domestic firms that are subject to an acquisition are paying wages (conditional of firm and 
worker characteristics) much above the market rates, with respect to their domestic counterparts 
that will not be subject to an acquisition. Taking the latter group as the benchmark, pooled cross-
section OLS results (not reported) find that the domestic firms that will be acquired are paying 
11.7% more. After acquisition, the acquired firms are paying a 7.1% premium while those firms 
that remain domestically owned are paying only 0.8% more. 
  
As a further check on the robustness of these results, we considered a different control group: 
those firms that are always foreign-owned. The motivation for this choice is that the latter firms 
(and their workers) are, from the observable point of view, more similar to the treatment group 
under study. To that extent they stand as a better control group. It turns out, however, that wage 
growth is still lower for acquired firms than for always-foreign-owned firms, controlling or not 
for worker and firm characteristics. From the regression results – see Table 8 –, the coefficient 
on the treatment dummy is –0.042 (–4.1p.p.).  
 
For the benefit of robustness, a further treatment group was considered: the subset of firms in the 
former target group that exhibit a positive level of foreign ownership before acquisition. The 
motivation was to control further for the possible selectivity involved in the process of foreign 
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acquisition. To the extent that this subset of firms has already been targeted by foreign firms, we 
may be more likely to pick up with our difference-in-differences estimator only the acquisition 
effect, rather than a combination between the selection and the acquisition effects. However, we 
found only 26 firms (and 2,578 workers) that satisfy this condition. These firms (and their 
workers) also exhibited characteristics which are even more different, with respect to the control 
group, than our main treatment group (see below). This prompted us to abandon this analysis. 
 
Coming back to the main results of this sub-section, one must describe the findings of negative 
wage premia as surprising, given the opposite stylised fact in the literature. However, this result 
is not unexpected from the point of view of the literature on takeovers. Here, it has been 
hypothesised that a key motivation for the acquisition of firms is that it enables new employers 
to renege on implicit contracts and to appropriate a larger portion of the surplus produced by 
employees (Schleifer and Summers, 1988). Other authors claim that mergers and acquisitions 
stem from a process of improved matches between firms and managers, whereby firms that are 
being badly run (for instance by paying wages too high given the workers alternative options) 
are more likely to be taken over (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). 
 
Two other matters should be taken into account. The first is that one may not extrapolate from 
the wage impact of foreign acquisitions to the wage differences between “standard” 
multinationals and domestic firms. Possibly a better control group would be domestic firms 
acquired by different domestic owners but it is not possible to identify these firms given the 
variables available in this data set. This criticism is, however, attenuated by the stylised fact that 
most of the current levels of FDI in developing countries (although lower shares in developed 
countries) are derived from firm acquisitions and not greenfield investment – so, to a large 
extent, a “standard” foreign firm was in an earlier stage domestically owned. In the specific case 
of Portugal, over the period 1996-2001, acquisitions (and equity increases) took 39% of net 
inward FDI, while greenfield investment (establishment of new firms) represented only 2% of 
that total value (Ministério das Finanças, 2003, p. 17).20 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
19 Similar results were obtained when one disregards the panel nature of the data (i.e. if one runs a pooled cross-
section regression and focuses on the interaction between the before/after and the foreign dummies). This suggests 
that, given the controls used, there are not significant unobservable differences across workers. 
20 The remaining share concerns credits and reinvested profits. 
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Another concern, probably more important, is that “cherry picking” may affect the comparison 
between acquired and non-acquired domestic firms. This is examined in the next section. 
 
 
4.6 Acquisitions – difference-in-differences and propensity score matching 
 
In this section, we combine the methods of the two previous sections. As mentioned before, this 
is motivated, inter alia, by the findings of Heckman et al (1997) that a difference-in-differences 
extension of the method of matching is particularly effective in eliminating bias, especially that 
due to time-invariant unobserved variables. In this case, that of domestic firms acquired by 
multinationals, there may be an important dimension of “cherry picking” over both observed and 
unobserved variables. However, the direction of the bias is unclear, as some authors argue that 
the asymmetry of information inherent in the acquisition of firms may be particularly acute for 
foreign firms, leading them to pick “lemons” rather than “cherries” (see Gioia and Thomsen, 
2003). 
 
To the extent that the unobserved variables are time-invariant, the combined method used here 
will provide unbiased estimates of the impact of foreign ownership upon wages. To the more 
likely extent that some of those variables are not time-invariant but are picked up by the 
observable variables used here, our approach will reduce the amount of bias. (See Blundell et al, 
2004, for an application of this approach to the evaluation of a job search assistance 
programme.) 
 
In this subsection, we consider as before the same two control groups (always-domestic and 
always-foreign firms) and the same treatment group (domestic firms that become foreign-
owned). We find again negative estimates (see the bottom row of Table 8): –1.5 p.p. and –7.8 
p.p. for the always domestic and the always foreign control groups, respectively. These results 
reinforce our previous findings as they suggest that the evidence of lower wage growth 
documented in the simple difference-in-differences analysis is not due to a poor match between 
workers in the treatment and control groups. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
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We provide new evidence on the role of FDI in labour markets from the perspective of wages, 
using detailed Portuguese matched data and drawing on a variety of methods. In contrast with 
the literature, we conclude that the wage differentials between workers in foreign and domestic 
firms cannot be easily reconciled with a causal impact from ownership to pay.  
 
Although when using OLS methods we find that foreign firms pay more in unconditional terms 
– the average premium across the nine years covered is about 32% –, the addition of control 
variables (worker and, in particular, firm characteristics) substantially decreases the premium to 
an average of about 11%. There was some mild support for a rent-sharing mechanism, as the 
foreign premium was found to be larger in some industries that may be associated with higher 
rents. However, no evidence is found of a positive relationship between the degree of foreign 
control and the wage premium of the firm, unlike what would be expected should foreign 
control have a positive causal impact upon pay.  
 
We also investigate if the foreign premium is constant along the wage distribution. We find that 
the premium is generally larger for workers at the top of the conditional distributions. This 
finding of heterogeneity is consistent with the case in which foreign firms select workers that are 
more skilled in their unobservable characteristics. Moreover, further evidence at odds with a 
significant wage premium was obtained using Propensity Score Matching, allowing for better 
like-for-like comparisons. Using this approach, we find a foreign wage premium on average of  
–1%, ranging between -9% and 1%, and, in most cases, statistically insignificant.  
 
Finally, we examine the wage consequences of the acquisition of domestic firms by foreign 
firms, in a difference-in-differences framework, considering two alternative control groups. 
Consistently with the previous results, negative coefficients are obtained. This finding also holds 
when we combine difference-in-differences with Propensity Score Matching.  
 
Overall, our results suggest that the foreign-firm wage premium commonly documented in the 
literature is exaggerated due to a combination of two factors: the lack of a proper like-for-like 
comparison between domestic and foreign firms; and (to a smaller extent) workers’ unobserved 
heterogeneity. Moreover, our results were obtained for a country with a predominantly non-
competitive labour market, where one could expect wage differentials to be longer lasting. This 
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feature reinforces the conclusion that our evidence is at odds with causal interpretations of the 
foreign-firm wage premium. 
 
These findings may have important implications for public policy. For instance, the results 
suggest that, should governments want to attract high-wage firms, criteria focusing on firm size 
or industry are more important than the distinction between domestic and foreign firms. In other 
words, workers would benefit from the presence of more firms with the characteristics of 
multinationals, regardless of their nationality. Taken together with the recent but increasingly 
more abundant evidence of weak productivity spillover effects, our findings strengthen the case 
for policy makers to re-think their strategies as to the attraction of foreign direct investment. 
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Table 1a - Descriptive Statistics, Workers in Foreign and Domestic Firms, 1991-1999
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Foreign Monthly Earnings 690.672 565.65 730.441 610.22 801.833 707.12 767.412 676.25 801.801 710.91
Firms Hourly Earnings 4.057 4.40 4.410 10.53 4.655 4.93 4.564 4.75 4.731 5.01
Log Hourly Earnings 1.194 0.57 1.263 0.58 1.307 0.61 1.294 0.59 1.342 0.58
Schooling Years 6.206 3.10 6.350 3.19 6.417 3.29 6.779 3.18 6.958 3.19
Experience 21.713 11.77 21.628 12.05 22.450 11.66 20.537 11.43 20.725 11.31
Tenure (Months) 115.027 104.89 115.957 108.70 121.226 106.47 99.074 100.01 103.560 101.68
Female 0.561 0.550 0.538 0.576 0.568
Food, Beverages 0.061 0.044 0.068 0.111 0.093
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.351 0.331 0.354 0.291 0.268
Wood, Cork 0.013 0.012 0.022 0.016 0.008
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.038 0.035 0.032 0.022 0.024
Chemicals 0.152 0.157 0.130 0.111 0.082
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.020 0.040 0.035 0.032 0.042
Metalurgic 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.012
Metalic, Transport 0.347 0.369 0.351 0.407 0.469
Others 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
North 0.447 0.507 0.472 0.350 0.364
Centre 0.100 0.096 0.109 0.241 0.193
Lisboa and T. V. 0.434 0.390 0.416 0.404 0.438
Observations 52,485 41,671 53,432 57,843 73,795
Domestic Monthly Earnings 528.463 419.95 566.039 495.42 582.574 537.62 575.465 1322.57 562.403 477.85
Firms Hourly Earnings 3.118 4.12 3.309 4.50 3.399 4.42 3.438 11.71 3.342 4.30
Log Hourly Earnings 0.954 0.52 1.005 0.53 1.023 0.54 1.024 0.54 1.026 0.52
Schooling Years 5.260 2.67 5.353 2.71 5.481 2.76 5.735 2.78 5.758 2.74
Experience 23.510 12.78 23.467 12.81 23.901 12.72 23.235 12.46 23.496 12.38
Tenure (Months) 116.348 108.02 116.343 107.76 120.108 108.50 110.819 104.92 114.901 108.29
Female 0.423 0.430 0.417 0.431 0.434
Food, Beverages 0.102 0.105 0.109 0.113 0.107
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.401 0.399 0.375 0.384 0.391
Wood, Cork 0.073 0.076 0.080 0.084 0.082
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.053 0.055 0.060 0.060 0.056
Chemicals 0.070 0.057 0.065 0.063 0.059
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.087 0.080 0.080 0.077 0.083
Metalurgic 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.016 0.016
Metalic, Transport 0.175 0.193 0.197 0.192 0.196
Others 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010
North 0.511 0.513 0.499 0.513 0.540
Centre 0.215 0.207 0.224 0.227 0.223
Lisboa and T. V. 0.253 0.257 0.254 0.232 0.211
Observations 471,745 475,336 441,029 404,563 427,461
Notes:
Monetary values are in real terms (2000 prices) and in euros.
Alentejo and Algarve regional dummies are omitted (their share ranges between .0% and 3.8%).
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Table 1b - Descriptive Statistics, Workers in Foreign and Domestic Firms, 1991-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999 Annual
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Average
Foreign Monthly Earnings 806.128 763.80 841.352 721.85 841.777 713.32 863.091 756.85 793.8
Firms Hourly Earnings 4.728 7.80 4.837 4.42 5.001 4.58 5.147 5.56 4.7
Log Hourly Earnings 1.340 0.57 1.386 0.55 1.426 0.54 1.446 0.55 1.3
Schooling Years 7.196 3.31 7.255 3.32 7.221 3.27 7.367 3.36 6.9
Experience 20.486 11.51 20.635 11.45 21.348 11.62 21.290 11.58 21.2
Tenure (Months) 105.067 102.62 106.347 103.00 111.682 104.88 106.749 105.78 109.4
Female 0.534 0.516 0.548 0.552 0.55
Food, Beverages 0.105 0.075 0.077 0.066 0.08
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.258 0.262 0.267 0.234 0.29
Wood, Cork 0.006 0.008 0.016 0.023 0.01
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.021 0.011 0.024 0.024 0.03
Chemicals 0.070 0.073 0.116 0.085 0.11
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.036 0.04
Metalurgic 0.016 0.023 0.018 0.011 0.01
Metalic, Transport 0.476 0.510 0.441 0.521 0.43
Others 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.00
North 0.360 0.325 0.382 0.398 0.40
Centre 0.209 0.229 0.254 0.264 0.19
Lisboa and T. V. 0.423 0.434 0.324 0.296 0.40
Observations 72,561 74,804 67,971 68,837 62,600
Domestic Monthly Earnings 603.105 526.74 593.721 509.92 610.191 506.39 627.803 520.11 583.3
Firms Hourly Earnings 3.519 4.96 3.536 5.00 3.708 3.78 3.854 4.13 3.5
Log Hourly Earnings 1.066 0.53 1.091 0.50 1.150 0.49 1.188 0.49 1.1
Schooling Years 5.922 2.87 5.958 2.84 6.124 2.95 6.206 2.98 5.8
Experience 23.936 12.34 23.884 12.39 24.328 12.45 24.528 12.39 23.8
Tenure (Months) 120.348 110.83 116.409 110.41 117.825 112.59 118.600 113.08 116.9
Female 0.435 0.449 0.436 0.442 0.43
Food, Beverages 0.112 0.101 0.106 0.110 0.11
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.391 0.389 0.363 0.362 0.38
Wood, Cork 0.075 0.092 0.089 0.088 0.08
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.061 0.066 0.063 0.062 0.06
Chemicals 0.064 0.055 0.062 0.065 0.06
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.082 0.082 0.090 0.085 0.08
Metalurgic 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.02
Metalic, Transport 0.188 0.186 0.202 0.203 0.19
Others 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.01
North 0.537 0.548 0.524 0.533 0.52
Centre 0.222 0.225 0.236 0.225 0.22
Lisboa and T. V. 0.214 0.201 0.211 0.216 0.23
Observations 412,961 428,839 409,721 434,319 433,997
Notes:
Monetary values are in real terms (2000 prices) and in euros.
Alentejo and Algarve regional dummies are omitted (their share ranges between .0% and 3.8%).
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Table 2a - Descriptive Statistics, Foreign and Domestic Firms, 1991-1999
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Foreign Monthly Earnings 684.276 422.88 736.970 373.94 776.020 457.39 807.893 474.84 837.143 512.65
Firms Hourly Earnings 4.046 2.58 4.374 2.36 4.573 2.75 4.801 2.96 4.922 3.08
Log Hourly Earnings 1.167 0.45 1.246 0.46 1.262 0.48 1.312 0.47 1.337 0.48
Number of Workers 181.324 305.52 180.021 304.82 181.115 341.77 169.094 397.01 200.867 450.71
Food, Beverages 0.080 0.088 0.089 0.101 0.111
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.291 0.271 0.268 0.251 0.259
Wood, Cork 0.050 0.039 0.061 0.054 0.047
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.050 0.046 0.042 0.054 0.049
Chemicals 0.180 0.180 0.182 0.170 0.143
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.047 0.063 0.059 0.049 0.057
Metalurgic 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.022
Metalic, Transport 0.269 0.282 0.268 0.288 0.301
Others 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.010
North 0.374 0.377 0.369 0.367 0.383
Centre 0.161 0.165 0.193 0.200 0.193
Lisboa and T. V. 0.438 0.426 0.425 0.411 0.402
Observations 361 284 358 406 405
Domestic Monthly Earnings 413.133 177.60 438.727 201.13 453.590 229.04 454.539 241.90 453.567 207.19
Firms Hourly Earnings 2.424 1.48 2.558 1.40 2.633 1.49 2.717 2.28 2.715 1.58
Log Hourly Earnings 0.763 0.31 0.808 0.32 0.827 0.33 0.852 0.34 0.869 0.33
Number of Workers 39.999 118.25 39.516 116.94 35.779 103.97 31.582 85.73 30.235 77.01
Food, Beverages 0.100 0.099 0.101 0.107 0.112
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.282 0.280 0.270 0.265 0.264
Wood, Cork 0.148 0.147 0.144 0.147 0.146
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.078 0.080 0.080 0.085 0.083
Chemicals 0.055 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.051
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.079 0.083 0.081 0.079 0.081
Metalurgic 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.012
Metalic, Transport 0.224 0.224 0.235 0.233 0.231
Others 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021
North 0.487 0.482 0.477 0.489 0.496
Centre 0.220 0.222 0.227 0.226 0.222
Lisboa and T. V. 0.253 0.255 0.256 0.244 0.240
Observations 15,095 15,278 15,351 16,171 16,757
Notes:
Monetary values are in real terms (2000 prices) and in euros.
Alentejo and Algarve regional dummies are omitted (their share ranges between .0% and 3.8%).
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Table 2b - Descriptive Statistics, Foreign and Domestic Firms, 1991-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999 Annual
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Average
Foreign Monthly Earnings 809.742 406.47 831.480 410.10 874.334 446.85 888.790 481.54 805.2
Firms Hourly Earnings 4.745 2.55 4.863 2.38 5.203 2.66 5.428 3.07 4.8
Log Hourly Earnings 1.319 0.45 1.364 0.43 1.437 0.44 1.466 0.44 1.3
Number of Workers 200.333 487.64 201.334 556.08 196.372 461.98 195.316 456.67 189.5
Food, Beverages 0.119 0.104 0.112 0.093 0.10
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.258 0.255 0.242 0.225 0.26
Wood, Cork 0.028 0.045 0.045 0.061 0.05
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.051 0.037 0.045 0.037 0.05
Chemicals 0.157 0.139 0.162 0.154 0.16
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.063 0.064 0.061 0.054 0.06
Metalurgic 0.018 0.025 0.021 0.017 0.02
Metalic, Transport 0.298 0.322 0.303 0.346 0.30
Others 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.01
North 0.389 0.356 0.364 0.380 0.37
Centre 0.192 0.230 0.237 0.228 0.20
Lisboa and T. V. 0.391 0.381 0.370 0.353 0.40
Observations 396 404 376 408 378
Domestic Monthly Earnings 476.766 234.64 479.462 226.46 493.402 221.24 502.278 221.16 462.8
Firms Hourly Earnings 2.814 1.66 2.881 1.77 3.031 1.41 3.138 2.45 2.8
Log Hourly Earnings 0.898 0.33 0.934 0.32 1.004 0.30 1.039 0.30 0.9
Number of Workers 30.397 84.98 28.035 70.78 27.200 69.77 27.582 82.47 32.3
Food, Beverages 0.114 0.116 0.118 0.114 0.11
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.263 0.260 0.247 0.251 0.26
Wood, Cork 0.139 0.151 0.149 0.152 0.15
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.085 0.083 0.087 0.084 0.08
Chemicals 0.051 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.05
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.084 0.081 0.086 0.084 0.08
Metalurgic 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.01
Metalic, Transport 0.232 0.229 0.236 0.234 0.23
Others 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.02
North 0.484 0.497 0.478 0.497 0.49
Centre 0.236 0.231 0.240 0.231 0.23
Lisboa and T. V. 0.237 0.226 0.233 0.227 0.24
Observations 16,093 17,853 17,596 18,819 16,557
Notes:
Monetary values are in real terms (2000 prices) and in euros.
Alentejo and Algarve regional dummies are omitted (their share ranges between .0% and 3.8%).
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Table 3 - Wage Premia of Foreign Firms, 1991-1999.
Specifications - Controls 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg. Max. Min.
No Controls 27.1% 29.4% 32.8% 31.0% 37.2% 31.5% 34.3% 31.8% 29.4% 31.6% 37.2% 27.1%
St. Errors [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.017 0.025 0.026 0.043 0.032 0.041 0.036 0.031
Human Capital (HC) 23.1% 24.5% 26.6% 28.4% 32.3% 26.5% 26.9% 27.9% 25.7% 26.9% 32.3% 23.1%
St. Errors [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Adjusted R-squared 0.451 0.436 0.45 0.438 0.453 0.453 0.445 0.477 0.477
HC and Firm Characteristics 11.6% 9.6% 11.3% 10.5% 12.2% 9.0% 8.0% 12.6% 13.0% 10.9% 13.0% 8.0%
St. Errors [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Adjusted R-squared 0.544 0.536 0.542 0.524 0.534 0.534 0.516 0.549 0.546
Observations 524,230 517,007 494,461 462,406 501,256 485,522 503,643 477,692 503,156
Notes:
Standard errors in brackets (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%).
Human Capital controls are: six dummies for educational degrees, a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure (in months), and a female dummy.
Firm Characteristics are: four regional dummies, log number of workers, a dummy for public firms and eight industry dummies.  
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Table 4 - Wage Premia of Foreign Firms in Different Industries, 1991-1999.
Specifications 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg. Max. Min.
Food, Beverages 6.5% 8.4% 9.2% 10.1% 10.1% 9.7% 6.9% 9.7% 8.5% 8.8% 10.1% 6.5%
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Wood, Cork -2.7% -0.6% -2.2% 1.4% 2.6% 4.8% 1.7% 2.3% 1.5% 1.0% 4.8% -2.7%
[0.002]** [0.002]* [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Paper, Graphical Arts 28.7% 21.0% 24.4% 26.5% 29.8% 29.8% 25.7% 23.7% 25.2% 26.1% 29.8% 21.0%
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Chemicals 29.0% 26.7% 29.7% 28.0% 28.9% 27.4% 23.1% 26.1% 24.5% 27.1% 29.7% 23.1%
[0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Non-Metalic Minerals 19.8% 26.4% 22.5% 23.9% 26.5% 29.6% 20.4% 20.1% 19.8% 23.2% 29.6% 19.8%
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Metalurgic 3.5% 14.7% 13.0% 22.9% 23.5% 29.3% 19.0% 22.9% 22.9% 19.1% 29.3% 3.5%
[0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
Metalic, Transport 13.1% 15.5% 15.7% 21.3% 20.6% 21.8% 17.0% 15.7% 13.8% 17.2% 21.8% 13.1%
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Others 7.5% 12.1% 10.7% 12.3% 12.6% 10.0% 6.1% 6.2% 7.4% 9.4% 12.6% 6.1%
[0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Foreign Firm 5.4% 7.8% 4.8% 3.5% 5.9% 3.9% 1.9% 4.8% 3.9% 4.6% 7.8% 1.9%
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
(Food, Beverages)*For. 42.5% 11.4% 22.6% 15.0% 22.6% 25.0% 32.3% 28.4% 30.3% 25.6% 42.5% 11.4%
[0.007]** [0.009]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
(Wood, Cork)*For. 28.0% 22.5% 7.0% 24.7% 15.0% 18.3% 19.6% 16.5% 14.8% 18.5% 28.0% 7.0%
[0.014]** [0.017]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.016]** [0.018]** [0.015]** [0.011]** [0.009]**
(Paper, Graphical Arts)*For. 6.9% 14.3% 16.6% 27.4% 29.4% 18.8% 8.5% 14.7% 26.6% 18.1% 29.4% 6.9%
[0.009]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.013]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
Chemicals*For. 11.0% 16.5% 18.8% 19.8% 11.2% 17.5% 24.0% 16.3% 21.9% 17.4% 24.0% 11.0%
[0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]**
(Non-Metalic Minerals)*For 8.8% 2.6% 0.0% 10.8% 5.4% 8.1% 13.8% 9.0% 12.2% 7.9% 13.8% 0.0%
[0.011]** [0.010]** [0.009] [0.010]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.008]**
Metalurgic*For. 31.5% -11.6% 13.4% -2.3% -7.8% -8.4% 4.0% -0.9% 16.0% 3.8% 31.5% -11.6%
[0.017]** [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.018] [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.010]** [0.011] [0.013]**
(Metalic, Transport)*For. 1.9% -5.2% 4.9% 3.9% 4.0% -0.4% 0.2% 5.8% 6.3% 2.4% 6.3% -5.2%
[0.004]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]**
Others*For. 5.3% -8.2% 4.7% 5.2% 4.7% 14.6% 9.1% 14.1% 14.8% 7.1% 14.8% -8.2%
[0.019]** [0.031]** [0.033] [0.035] [0.033] [0.034]** [0.032]** [0.028]** [0.037]**
Adjusted R-squared 0.546 0.538 0.543 0.525 0.536 0.537 0.519 0.551 0.548
Observations 524,230 517,007 494,461 462,406 501,256 485,522 503,643 477,692 503,156
Notes:
Standard errors in brackets (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%).
Specification used includes controls for human capital and firm characteristics (see previous tables for definitions).
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Table 5a - Wage Premia of Foreign Firms for Different Degrees of Control, 1991-1999.
Specifications 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg. Max. Min.
1%-9% 13.8% 9.6% 9.5% 16.1% 13.9% 9.7% 9.6% 2.5% 20.7% 11.7% 20.7% 2.5%
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.010]* [0.007]**
10%-19% 17.2% -2.2% -5.3% 22.9% 37.2% 28.1% 25.9% 15.6% -3.4% 15.1% 37.2% -5.3%
[0.008]** [0.013] [0.010]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.010]**
20%-29% 18.1% 6.4% 3.9% 4.6% -1.8% 14.0% 3.6% -4.3% -2.2% 4.7% 18.1% -4.3%
[0.004]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]**
30%-39% 19.7% -3.4% -4.1% 18.9% 12.0% 0.0% 9.2% 11.9% 13.9% 8.7% 19.7% -4.1%
[0.007]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008] [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]**
40%-49% 22.5% 27.5% 19.0% 7.9% 17.2% 11.4% 13.7% 14.0% 15.0% 16.5% 27.5% 7.9%
[0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]**
50%-59% 18.6% 6.5% 6.6% 11.3% 8.3% 8.5% 4.1% -1.2% 9.7% 8.1% 18.6% -1.2%
[0.006]** [0.008]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.007] [0.006]**
60%-69% 2.3% 17.2% 16.6% 40.8% 36.3% 10.4% 36.5% 36.5% 24.6% 24.6% 40.8% 2.3%
[0.010]* [0.007]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.008]** [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
70%-79% 2.1% 0.5% 21.2% 38.3% 26.9% 25.0% 6.2% 23.6% -5.4% 15.4% 38.3% -5.4%
[0.009]* [0.011] [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]**
80%-89% 7.6% 10.5% 10.5% 12.9% 12.2% 10.5% 17.4% 14.6% 14.3% 12.3% 17.4% 7.6%
[0.005]** [0.008]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]**
90%-99% 11.5% 8.0% 15.6% 10.6% 10.3% 15.5% 13.9% 10.8% 17.7% 12.7% 17.7% 8.0%
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]**
100% 15.8% 11.2% 10.4% 7.9% 12.6% 7.8% 6.7% 13.7% 13.3% 11.0% 15.8% 6.7%
[0.002]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.538 0.543 0.528 0.538 0.537 0.518 0.551 0.548
Observations 524,230 517,007 494,461 462,406 501,256 485,522 503,643 477,692 503,156
Notes:
Standard errors in brackets (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%).
Specification used includes controls for human capital and firm characteristics (see previous tables for definitions).  
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Table 5b - Wage Premia for Foreign Firms, Different Definitions, 1991-1999
Premium St. Error Premium St. Error Premium St. Error Premium St. Error Premium St. Error Premium St. Error Premium St. Error Premium St. Error Premium St. Error
>=10% 14.8% (0.002)** 9.9% (0.002)** 10.3% (0.002)** 11.3% (0.002)** 13.1% (0.002)** 10.5% (0.002)** 9.3% (0.002)** 12.3% (0.002)** 12.3% (0.001)**
>=20% 14.7% (0.002)** 10.1% (0.002)** 10.7% (0.002)** 10.5% (0.002)** 11.7% (0.002)** 9.4% (0.002)** 8.4% (0.002)** 12.0% (0.002)** 12.7% (0.002)**
>=30% 13.0% (0.002)** 10.2% (0.002)** 11.2% (0.002)** 10.8% (0.002)** 12.7% (0.002)** 8.9% (0.002)** 8.7% (0.002)** 13.1% (0.002)** 13.4% (0.002)**
>=40% 12.5% (0.002)** 11.0% (0.002)** 12.0% (0.002)** 10.4% (0.002)** 12.6% (0.002)** 9.2% (0.002)** 8.5% (0.002)** 13.0% (0.002)** 13.3% (0.002)**
>=50% 11.6% (0.002)** 9.6% (0.002)** 11.3% (0.002)** 10.5% (0.002)** 12.2% (0.002)** 9.0% (0.002)** 8.0% (0.002)** 12.6% (0.002)** 13.0% (0.002)**
N. Obs. 524230 517007 494461 462406 501256 485522 503643 477692
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
The specification considered includes human capital and firm characteristics.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Table 6 - Quantile Regression Results  
          
 25th perc. 75th perc. 
  Coeff. St. Error Coeff. 
St. 
Error 
1991 0.1027 0.0015 0.1096 0.0019 
1992 0.0953 0.0017 0.0888 0.0026 
1993 0.0944 0.0016 0.1136 0.0028 
1994 0.0848 0.0015 0.1159 0.0020 
1995 0.0951 0.0014 0.1255 0.0018 
1996 0.0704 0.0014 0.0978 0.0019 
1997 0.0683 0.0016 0.0920 0.0024 
1998 0.0969 0.0014 0.1386 0.0022 
1999 0.1085 0.0016 0.1345 0.0024 
     
Note:     
In each each, the full set of controls is considered. 
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Table 7 - Propensity Score Matching estimates 
       
Year Estimate St. Error  
1991 -2.36% 0.006  
1992 0.31% 0.007  
1993 1.30% 0.006  
1994 -8.93% 0.010  
1995 -0.44% 0.010  
1996 -1.95% 0.013  
1997 -0.14% 0.012  
1998 1.09% 0.008  
1999 0.17% 0.010  
Average -1.22%    
    
Note:    
Standard errors obtained via bootstrapping (50 repetitions) 
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Table 8 - Difference-in-differences Descriptive Statistics and Results
Control group: workers in firms that are always domestically-owned.
Treatment Control 1 Control 2
Variable Mean Mean Coeff. St. Error Mean Coeff. St. Error
Change in Log Hourly Wages 0.006 0.051 0.070
1st Cycle 0.399 0.509 -0.014 0.003 0.340 -0.038 0.010
2nd Cycle 0.232 0.263 -0.009 0.003 0.307 -0.027 0.010
3rd Cycle 0.170 0.098 -0.014 0.004 0.189 -0.031 0.010
Secondary 0.107 0.063 -0.009 0.004 0.108 -0.019 0.011
"Bacharelato" 0.017 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.013 -0.003 0.016
"Licenciatura" 0.040 0.014 0.001 0.006 0.023 -0.011 0.013
Experience 115.247 127.974 0.000 0.000 111.62 0.000 0.000
Tenure (Months) 22.570 24.350 -0.001 0.000 20.80 -0.003 0.000
Female 0.386 0.426 -0.012 0.001 0.56 -0.021 0.003
Log Firm Size 6.080 4.766 -0.008 0.000 6.38 -0.030 0.001
Difference in Years 1.410 1.332 0.030 0.001 1.53 0.074 0.002
Food, Beverages 0.088 0.109 0.013 0.002 0.064 -0.021 0.007
Wood, Cork 0.039 0.081 -0.001 0.003 0.011 -0.108 0.011
Paper, Graphical Arts, Edition 0.038 0.051 0.005 0.003 0.013 0.029 0.011
Chemicals 0.091 0.059 -0.026 0.003 0.128 -0.056 0.006
Non-Metalic Minerals 0.032 0.082 0.015 0.003 0.033 -0.044 0.009
Metalurgic 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.005 0.007 -0.188 0.011
Metalic, Transport 0.443 0.197 0.008 0.002 0.504 -0.034 0.005
Others 0.001 0.008 -0.015 0.007 0.001 -0.103 0.039
Centre 0.211 0.229 -0.001 0.002 0.238 0.038 0.005
Lisboa and T. V. 0.408 0.216 -0.020 0.002 0.380 0.009 0.004
Alentejo 0.033 0.013 -0.008 0.005 0.004 0.033 0.014
Algarve 0.001 0.007 -0.032 0.007 0.000 0.289 0.067
1991 0.165 0.148 0.008 0.003 0.104 -0.125 0.006
1992 0.250 0.117 -0.059 0.003 0.139 -0.004 0.006
1993 0.108 0.114 -0.042 0.003 0.227 0.018 0.006
1994 0.089 0.118 -0.024 0.003 0.211 0.000 0.006
1995 0.063 0.131 -0.022 0.003 0.055 0.004 0.007
1996 0.161 0.158 0.023 0.002 0.098 -0.020 0.007
1997 0.069 0.116 0.001 0.003 0.068 0.002 0.007
Treatment -0.031 0.003 -0.042 0.003
Observations 18,269 250,031 268,300 27,229 46,476
Adj. R squared 0.0165 0.0983
Propensity Score estimate -1.54% -7.83%
Notes:
Treatment group: Workers in firms that are domestic in the first period and foreign in the second.
Control group 1: firms that are always domestically owned.
Control group 2: firms that are always foreign owned.
The standard deviations of the change in log wages is 0,358, 0,31 and 0,3 for the treatment
group and for the two control groups, respectively.
DID - Control 2DID - Control 1
 
 
Table A1a - Descriptive Statistics, Workers in Foreign and Domestic Firms, 1991-1999 (10% foreign ownership definition).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Foreign Monthly Earnings 729,233 562,756 748,363 641,801 811,258 696,585 775,501 659,695 817,393 717,845
Firms Hourly Earnings 4,324 4,434 4,544 9,743 4,699 5,272 4,637 4,698 4,812 4,979
Log Hourly Earnings 1,264 0,573 1,297 0,576 1,324 0,601 1,318 0,586 1,365 0,576
Schooling Years 6,211 3,166 6,322 3,186 6,417 3,318 6,780 3,230 6,974 3,261
Experience 23,153 12,043 22,357 12,151 23,237 11,873 21,370 11,730 21,573 11,700
Tenure (Months) 126,584 107,267 122,124 111,070 128,755 109,286 105,798 103,571 112,586 107,298
Female 0,490 0,507 0,493 0,543 0,536
North 0,424 0,470 0,453 0,334 0,368
Centre 0,113 0,100 0,116 0,227 0,192
Lisboa and T. V. 0,450 0,423 0,428 0,435 0,436
Observations 70.335 52.362 63.084 69.466 85.323
Domestic Monthly Earnings 483,882 360,092 547,771 474,813 552,047 491,848 549,205 1231,43 539,510 448,419
Firms Hourly Earnings 2,829 3,910 3,188 4,303 3,221 4,131 3,262 11,558 3,193 4,154
Log Hourly Earnings 0,889 0,465 0,977 0,517 0,984 0,519 0,987 0,513 0,994 0,493
Schooling Years 5,135 2,525 5,297 2,650 5,387 2,658 5,643 2,668 5,676 2,645
Experience 22,990 12,809 23,270 12,844 23,584 12,745 23,016 12,463 23,295 12,370
Tenure (Months) 109,846 106,141 113,417 106,747 115,418 106,809 107,201 103,164 111,715 106,740
Female 0,444 0,439 0,432 0,440 0,443
North 0,542 0,527 0,518 0,532 0,553
Centre 0,227 0,214 0,228 0,230 0,224
Lisboa and T. V. 0,208 0,235 0,229 0,209 0,196
Observations 423.346 446.567 409.669 378.135 403.845
Notes:
Monetary values are in real terms (2000 prices) and in euros.
Alentejo and Algarve regional dummies are omitted (their share ranges between .0% and 3.8%).
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Table A1b - Descriptive Statistics, Workers in Foreign and Domestic Firms, 1991-1999 (10% foreign ownership definition). 
                           
  1996  1997  1998   1999  Annual 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.  Average
Foreign Monthly Earnings 832,928 767,144 860,720 720,861 855,704 725,472  875,588 748,271 811,85 
Firms Hourly Earnings 4,877 7,502 4,955 4,485 5,088 4,644  5,267 6,442 4,80 
 Log Hourly Earnings 1,370 0,574 1,411 0,555 1,447 0,538  1,465 0,550 1,36 
 Schooling Years 7,180 3,355 7,267 3,375 7,255 3,332  7,369 3,406 6,86 
 Experience 21,365 11,859 21,470 11,844 22,107 11,964  22,016 11,854 22,07 
 Tenure (Months) 113,653 107,760 114,099 108,326 120,692 111,406  114,733 111,051 117,67 
 Female 0,502  0,487  0,512   0,516  0,51 
 North 0,364  0,334  0,389   0,393  0,39 
 Centre 0,206  0,228  0,253   0,256  0,19 
 Lisboa and T. V. 0,423  0,428  0,323   0,314  0,41 
 Observations 84.861  88.031  80.615   79.459  74.837 
            
Domestic Monthly Earnings 571,277 484,371 568,369 487,239 580,210 464,515  602,491 488,942 554,97 
Firms Hourly Earnings 3,329 4,797 3,384 4,802 3,528 3,579  3,690 3,605 3,29 
 Log Hourly Earnings 1,029 0,503 1,059 0,482 1,116 0,464  1,159 0,468 1,02 
 Schooling Years 5,822 2,762 5,874 2,757 6,009 2,842  6,119 2,899 5,66 
 Experience 23,761 12,348 23,675 12,369 24,203 12,446  24,365 12,376 23,57 
 Tenure (Months) 116,938 109,310 112,610 108,318 114,152 110,524  115,158 111,048 112,94 
 Female 0,445  0,460  0,447   0,453  0,44 
 North 0,554  0,561  0,535   0,548  0,54 
 Centre 0,222  0,224  0,240   0,224  0,23 
 Lisboa and T. V. 0,196  0,187  0,194   0,201  0,21 
  Observations 388.000    402.799    384.213     411.037    404.572 
            
Notes:            
Monetary values are in real terms (2000 prices) and in euros.         
Alentejo and Algarve regional dummies are omitted (their share ranges between .0% and 3.8%).     
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Table A2 - Wage Premia of Foreign Firms, 1991-1999 (10% foreign ownership definition).      
                          
Specifications - Controls 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg. Max. Min. 
No Controls 39,2% 35,3% 36,2% 35,9% 42,3% 37,6% 39,9% 36,3% 33,4% 37,4% 42,3% 33,4% 
St. Errors [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**    
Adjusted R-squared 0,046 0,029 0,035 0,039 0,061 0,049 0,06 0,053 0,044    
             
Human Capital (HC) 27,4% 26,5% 25,5% 29,2% 32,7% 28,1% 28,1% 28,0% 25,7% 27,9% 32,7% 25,5% 
St. Errors [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**    
Adjusted R-squared 0,461 0,443 0,453 0,444 0,46 0,461 0,452 0,482 0,481    
             
HC and Firm Characteristics 15,0% 9,7% 10,4% 11,3% 13,0% 11,4% 9,2% 12,6% 12,9% 11,7% 15,0% 9,2% 
St. Errors [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**    
Adjusted R-squared 0,548 0,539 0,543 0,526 0,541 0,541 0,522 0,554 0,56    
             
Observations 524.230 517.007 494.461 462.406 501.256 485.522 503.643 477.692 503.156       
             
Notes:             
Standard errors in brackets (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%).         
Human Capital controls are: six dummies for educational degrees, a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure (in months), and a female dummy. 
Firm Characteristics are: four regional dummies, log number of workers, a dummy for public firms and eight industry dummies.   
 
